Instiq
Chapter 3 · Infrastructure Security·v3.1.0·Updated 6/11/2026·~10 min

What's changed: Added figure aws-genai-security (OWASP LLM risks → AWS mitigations) to the gen-AI security section s4. The cloned base chapters inherit SCS-C02 figures; s4 was the only section lacking one, now filled.

3.3Protecting Compute and Endpoints

Key points

Understand compute defense—Systems Manager (patch/Session Manager), hardening/golden AMIs, Inspector, bastion-less (SSM), and EC2 metadata (IMDSv2). Keep instances secure.

Protect compute via patching, hardening, and secure access. Avoid open SSH; access via SSM.

3.3.1Compute protection

Diagram of compute protection: Systems Manager Patch Manager auto-applies OS patches; Session Manager connects to instances securely without SSH/bastion (no open ports, operations audited); Inspector continuously scans vulnerabilities; golden AMIs distribute hardened standard images; and EC2 instance metadata enforces IMDSv2 (token required) to prevent SSRF-based credential theft—keeping instances secure.
Protecting compute and endpoints
  • Patch Manager: auto-apply OS patches to reduce vulnerabilities.
  • Session Manager: connect securely without SSH/bastion; no open ports, operations audited.
  • Hardening/golden AMI: distribute standardized hardened images.
  • IMDSv2: require tokens for instance metadata to prevent SSRF-based credential theft.
Exam point

Common on SCS-C02: secure bastion-less access = Session Manager, auto-patching = Patch Manager, metadata protection = enforce IMDSv2, vulnerability scanning = Inspector. The recommended pattern is to keep SSH (port 22) closed and connect via Session Manager.

SCS-C02 compute defense probes "reducing attack surface and keeping access and credentials safe." Systems Manager Session Manager opens no SSH/RDP ports and needs no bastion: IAM-authorized users get a shell via browser/CLI, with sessions recorded to CloudTrail/CloudWatch Logs/S3 for audit (no key management; port 22 can stay closed). Patch Manager auto-applies OS/app patches via patch baselines and maintenance windows, and Inspector continuously scans EC2/ECR/Lambda for CVEs, surfacing unpatched vulnerabilities. Distribute images as golden AMIs (hardened to CIS benchmarks, unneeded services off, pipelined with EC2 Image Builder). IMDSv2 requires a session token (PUT→GET) for instance-metadata access and can set a hop limit, preventing the classic attack where SSRF steals the instance role’s temporary credentials (enforce IMDSv2, disable IMDSv1). Pass credentials via an instance role, never placing long-lived keys on instances. The key is to go bastion-less and close ports with Session Manager, manage vulnerabilities with Patch Manager/Inspector, harden via golden AMIs, and protect metadata by enforcing IMDSv2.

GoalMeansKey point
Secure accessSession ManagerNo SSH/bastion; ports closed; audited
Reduce vulnerabilitiesPatch Manager / InspectorAuto-patch + continuous scan
Hardened standard imageGolden AMICIS hardening; Image Builder
Metadata protectionEnforce IMDSv2Token required; prevent SSRF theft
Note

Scenario: Operators must connect securely to EC2 in private subnets with no SSH ports open, and you must also prevent SSRF from stealing the instance role’s credentials. → Connect bastion-less via Session Manager (SSM agent + IAM authz), keep port 22 closed, and record operations to CloudWatch Logs/S3. Enforce IMDSv2 on instances (disable IMDSv1, set hop limit) to prevent metadata theft, auto-apply patches with Patch Manager, and monitor vulnerabilities with Inspector.

Note

FAQ: Why enforce IMDSv2? IMDSv1 returns metadata (including the instance role’s temporary credentials) on a simple request, so an app SSRF vulnerability lets an attacker steal credentials. IMDSv2 requires obtaining a session token via PUT before any GET and supports a hop limit, making SSRF-based theft far harder. Disable IMDSv1 and require IMDSv2.

Warning

Exam trap: Designing operational access by opening SSH ports on a bastion increases attack surface and is not recommended—Session Manager needs no open ports or bastion and provides audit. Also, placing long-lived access keys on instances is wrong—use an instance role (temporary credentials) and enforce IMDSv2 to prevent theft.

3.3.2Section summary

  • Protection = Patch Manager + golden AMI + Inspector
  • Secure access = Session Manager (bastion-less) / metadata = IMDSv2

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Quick check

(just a quick review)

Q1. Connect to EC2 securely without opening SSH or running a bastion. What?

Q2. Prevent SSRF from stealing temporary credentials via instance metadata. What do you enforce?

Q3. Continuously auto-apply OS patches across many EC2. What?

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